The first goal is to become familiar with key theories of market design, including aspects of matching theory, implementation theory, auctions, and mechanism design. The second goal to study prominent real life examples of market design.

Many markets have evolved spontaneously, shaped by various economic forces. This course is devoted to markets that have instead been created, engineered, or designed. Online auctions such as eBay is one example of such markets. Another group of examples are the mechanisms designed to allocate students to universities or children to schools. Such markets and mechanisms have been designed to serve a specific goal. Thus online auctions usually serve the purpose of revenue maximization. University admission mechanisms strive to attain a stable and fair matching of students to universities. The course covers aspects of matching theory, implementation theory, auctions, and mechanism design. These ideas are illustrated by prominent examples of market design such as the Boston mechanism of school choice and spectrum auctions.

This course is in transition.
See the Master Education and Examination Regulations for more information.

The following rule applies to master Economics students who started the programme prior to academic year 2023-2024.
Specifically, those with one of the following specialisations/majors:
* Market Regulation and Design
* No specialisation
TRANSITIONAL REGULATION (EBC4242):
In 2024-2025 students are allowed to repeat the examination and resit.


PREREQUISITES:
"Advanced Microeconomics" (EBC4232) or equivalent.