In this course the student will learn to formally analyse collective decision rules w.r.t. various aspects such as anonymity, Pareto-optimality, neutrality, and strategy-proofness.

In collective decision-making (e.g., elections) the rules and procedures used to arrive at a decision may have a considerable impact on the final result. Different rules may lead to different decisions. In this course such rules are studied. In particular, desirable properties like Pareto-optimality and non-manipulability are investigated.
Some topics are:
- voting schemes for two alternatives, theorem of May;
- voting schemes for more than two alternatives, score rules, veto rules;
- Condorcet winners, dictatorial rules, anonymity, neutrality, positive association, impossibility theorems of Arrow, Gibbard and Satterthwaite;
- location problems;
- stategy-proof division.

Lecture notes.

A mathematic level comparable to a Bsc Econometrics & Operations Research meets the prerequisites.
Exchange students need to have obtained a Bachelor degree and an advanced level in mathematics.
An advanced level of English.