In this course the student will learn to formally analyse collective decision rules w.r.t. various aspects such as anonymity, Pareto-optimality, neutrality, and strategy-profess.

PLEASE NOTE THAT THE INFORMATION ABOUT THE TEACHING AND ASSESSMENT METHOD(S) USED IN THIS COURSE IS WITH RESERVATION. THE INFORMATION PROVIDED HERE IS BASED ON THE COURSE SETUP PRIOR TO THE CORONAVIRUS CRISIS. AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE CRISIS, COURSE COORDINATORS MAY BE FORCED TO CHANGE THE TEACHING AND ASSESSMENT METHODS USED. THE MOST UP-TO-DATE INFORMATION ABOUT THE TEACHING/ASSESSMENT METHOD(S) WILL BE AVAILABLE IN THE COURSE SYLLABUS.

In collective decision-making (e.g., elections) the rules and procedures used to arrive at a decision may have a considerable impact on the final result. Different rules may lead to different decisions. In this course such rules are studied. In particular, desirable properties like Pareto-optimality and non-manipulability are investigated.
Some topics are:
- voting schemes for two alternatives, theorem of May;
- voting schemes for more than two alternatives, score rules, veto rules;
- Condorcet winners, dictatorial rules, anonymity, neutrality, positive association, impossibility theorems of Arrow, Gibbard and Satterthwaite;
- location problems;
- strategy-proof division;
- implementation.

Lecture notes.

A mathematic level comparable to a BSc Econometrics & Operations Research meets the prerequisites.
Exchange students need to have obtained a Bachelor degree and an advanced level in mathematics.
An advanced level of English.