The first goal is to become familiar with key theories of market design, including aspects of matching theory, implementation theory, auctions, and mechanism design. The second goal to study prominent real life examples of market design.

PLEASE NOTE THAT THE INFORMATION ABOUT THE TEACHING AND ASSESSMENT METHOD(S) USED IN THIS COURSE IS WITH RESERVATION. A RE-EMERGENCE OF THE CORONAVIRUS AND NEW COUNTERMEASURES BY THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT MIGHT FORCE COORDINATORS TO CHANGE THE TEACHING AND ASSESSMENT METHODS USED. THE MOST UP-TO-DATE INFORMATION ABOUT THE TEACHING/ASSESSMENT METHOD(S) WILL BE AVAILABLE IN THE COURSE SYLLABUS.

Many markets have evolved spontaneously, shaped by various economic forces. This course is devoted to markets that have instead been created, engineered, or designed. Online auctions such as eBay is one example of such markets. Another group of examples are the mechanisms designed to allocate students to universities or children to schools. Such markets and mechanisms have been designed to serve a specific goal. Thus online auctions usually serve the purpose of revenue maximization. University admission mechanisms strive to attain a stable and fair matching of students to universities. The course covers aspects of matching theory, implementation theory, auctions, and mechanism design. These ideas are illustrated by prominent examples of market design such as the Boston mechanism of school choice and spectrum auctions.

Advanced Microeconomics (EBC4232) or equivalent.